"No provision of the Statute or the Rules precludes the Tribunal from ruling on the basis of its inherent powers on a request for early release by a convicted person who is not serving his sentence in a State signatory to the agreement with the Tribunal on the enforcement of sentences". One domestic law commentator has pointed out that because the concept of inherent jurisdiction de es precise de nition, in order to understand its nature and extent in a particular court it is necessary to consider the decided cases of that particular court. 6 This article will attempt to do that in relation to the ICTY and ICTR, by analysing the cases in which the Tribunals have purported to invoke an inherent jurisdiction, and commenting upon them.
In order to provide a context for such an exposition of cases, the article begins by considering the jurisprudence relating to inherent jurisdiction in international law generally, and the creation and powers of the Tribunals. It then considers the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction in domestic common law systems, because it will be argued that the ICTY and ICTR are drawing strongly on principles of the common law in their consideration of their own inherent jurisdiction. 7 Then it discusses, in chronological order, the cases in which the ICTY and ICTR have claimed an inherent jurisdiction, and attempt to analyse them against the established jurisprudence. It concludes that most of the cases t comfortably into the framework of the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction, but two cases -Order for Early Release of Kolundzija and Tadic (Sentencing Appeals) -appear to exceed the limits of that doctrine. Finally, the article brie y considers the issue of post-appellate correction of wrongful convictions. Although the issue never arose at Nuremberg, arguably if it had the Control Council would have had the power to overturn a wrongful convic-5 It should be noted that both the international and the domestic jurisprudence use the
